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ASCRIBING  COMPLEX  MENTAL  PROCESSES* 
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Department of Philosophy 
Texas A&M University 
MARC D.  HAUSER 
Department of Zoology 
University of California, Davis 
The demise of behaviorism has made ethologists more willing to ascribe men- 
tal states to  animals.  However,  a methodology  that can  avoid  the charge of 
excessive  anthropomorphism  is needed. We describe a series of experiments that 
could help determine whether the behavior of nonhuman animals towards dead 
conspecifics is concept mediated. These experiments form the basis of a general 
point. The behavior of some animals is clearly guided by complex mental pro- 
cesses.  The techniques developed by comparative psychologists  and behavioral 
ecologists  are able to provide us with the tools to critically evaluate hypotheses 
concerning the continuity between human minds and animal minds. 
1.  Introduction.  Recent willingness to use mentalistic vocabulary to de- 
scribe animal behavior has resulted from a decline in the popularity of 
the behaviorist approach to psychology introduced by Watson and cham- 
pioned by Skinner. It has not gone unnoticed that the current problems 
associated with the use of mentalistic vocabulary to describe animal be- 
havior are similar to those that were faced by comparative psychologists 
of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries (see Burghardt 1985 for a 
comparison of  the problems). Then,  as now,  critics of  mentalistic vo- 
cabulary in science have suggested that it is overly anthropomorphic  and 
cannot be applied in a testable manner. Behaviorism was  a reaction to 
the often unbridled anthropomorphism  of the comparative psychologists. 
As Burghardt  points out, if modem cognitive ethology is to successfully 
incorporate mentalistic descriptions, it is in need of a methodology that 
can avoid the charge of excessive  anthropomorphism. 
In this paper we explore the use of mentalistic terms by cognitive ethol- 
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ogists to describe animal behavior. As an example of a mentalistic term, 
we consider the notion of concept. We consider different aspects of be- 
havior that are associated with human concepts, and address the question 
of  whether it might be appropriate  to say that nonhuman animals have 
concepts.  Although,  in recent times,  philosophers have discussed con- 
cepts rather less than they have discussed other cognitive entities such as 
beliefs,  we  have chosen  to look  at concepts because of  the somewhat 
more frequent use of this term by cognitive scientists. This paper is not 
intended as a review of the literature on categorization by animals (see 
Hamad 1987 for a series of papers that describe recent research). Neither 
is it intended as a review of philosophical literature  on concepts. Instead, 
we  intend to  raise some  methodological  issues  that attend attempts to 
attribute  concepts to animals. In the latter part of the paper, we specifi- 
cally focus on animal behavior with respect to death and describe a series 
of  experiments that would allow comparison between animal responses 
to death and concept-mediated  human behavior in response to death. These 
experiments will be posed as thought experiments, enabling us to focus 
on the particular  methodological problems that are associated with such 
tests. Our analysis of concepts in nonhuman animals is intended to pro- 
vide  ethologists  with a level  of  description of  animal cognition that is 
useful to them in the design of experiments. Philosophers should be in- 
terested in the mental abilities of animals since the issues that arise pro- 
vide a testing ground for philosophical theories of mind.1 
Griffin (1981)  has been foremost in challenging cognitive  ethologists 
to pay more attention to the mental states of animals, especially animal 
awareness. We have chosen to phrase our discussion in terms of mental 
states rather than the less innocuous "cognitive processes" since the for- 
mer are often taken to imply the attribution  of properties to animals that 
are closer to those Griffin challenges ethologists to investigate. 
Although biologists have become increasingly  more willing to use terms 
that suggest complex mental states, the use of  such terms is sometimes 
not intended to be taken literally. Terms such as strategy, deceit, cheat- 
ing,  and rape have been deliberately introduced into behavioral ecology 
(Krebs and Davies  1984) with explicit disavowals of the necessity to in- 
voke any mental states underlying the behaviors described by these terms. 
As an example of this, Munn (1986) describes a case of "deceitful" alarm 
calls in mixed species flocks of birds where "deceit" is given a nonmen- 
talistic interpretation.  For most philosophers, the question naturally arises 
'In this paper, we  cannot hope to take on Wittgensteinean worries about internal rep- 
resentations. One path for cognitive  science  is to proceed on the assumption that repre- 
sentations guide behavior, and to set itself the task of finding the grammar of those rep- 
resentations (e.g.,  a la Fodor 1981). It is the task of applying this strategy to animals with 
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whether it is appropriate  to call this behavior "deceit" at all since many 
philosophical analyses of deceit (e.g.,  ones based on a Gricean account 
of  communication) would require the attribution of  complex  intentions 
that the birds almost certainly do not have. Nonetheless, this metaphorical 
use of terms such as "deceit" is an accepted part of behavioral ecology 
which must be understood on its own terms. 
Other researchers in both behavioral ecology  and experimental psy- 
chology have intended their use of mentalistic vocabulary much less met- 
aphorically. This is particularly  true of those whose research has focused 
on cognition in nonhuman primates. The apparent sophistication of pri- 
mates in comparison to most other animals makes them prime candidates 
for investigation of mental properties. Hinde (1982) remarks that the dan- 
gers of anthropomorphism  have been much overemphasized and that anal- 
ysis of primate behavior seems to require use of some mentalistic terms. 
Behavioral ecologists  interested in the link between evolutionary theory 
and complex  mental processes  (e.g.,  Bachmann and  Kummer  1980, 
Kummer 1982, Cheney and Seyfarth 1985) have shown themselves will- 
ing to use  terms such as  "knowledge" and "meaning" to describe the 
primates they study. It is our view, to be explained below, that mentalistic 
terminology gives  ethologists a mode of description of animals that en- 
ables them to explain behavior within an evolutionary framework. 
Experimental psychologists  cum comparative psychologists  have also 
helped themselves to the use of mentalistic terms. Premack's (1986)  el- 
egant experiments on causal inference in chimpanzees illustrate this ap- 
proach. Although mentalistic terms have most commonly been used for 
nonhuman  primates, behavioral descriptions of other organisms have also 
drawn upon mentalistic vocabulary (e.g.,  Gould and Gould  1982).  On 
the basis of Skinnerian  experiments, Herrnstein  et al. (1976) have implied 
that pigeons have concepts.  Herrnstein's experiments will  be discussed 
in some detail below. 
Despite this use of mentalistic terms, most behavioral ecologists,  cog- 
nitive ethologists and comparative psychologists have not explicitly dis- 
cussed the theoretical role played by such terms (for exceptions see con- 
tributions  in  Griffin  1982,  and  Harre  and  Reynolds  1984).  Some 
philosophers have suggested that mentalistic vocabulary or moderate an- 
thropomorphism might  play  a  heuristic role  in  hypothesis  generation 
(Dennett 1983,  and Asquith 1984) and this view  has been endorsed by 
some researchers of animal behavior (e.g.,  Burghardt 1985).  However, 
one implication behind some of these suggestions appears to be that men- 
talistic vocabulary does not directly correspond to any underlying reality. 
Dennett, for instance, claims that mentalistic terms ultimately will  not 
play  any role  in  scientific  description of  organisms,  eventually being 
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(Dennett 1969,  1983).  In contrast, Griffin's proposal for the scientific 
exploration of animal awareness apparently presupposes that the mental 
states of  animals are real phenomena in need of  scientific explanation. 
This seems to us to be a more reasonable attitude towards mental states 
in animals than the eliminationist position implied by the view that talk 
of mental states is merely heuristic. Although it is our view that mental 
attributions  are necessary for the adequate explanation of the behavior of 
some animals, our aim in this paper is not to provide arguments for this 
claim. Rather, we are concerned with discussing the kinds of experiments 
that might make mental attributions  plausible. 
In order to explicate the proper use of mentalistic terms in ethological 
explanations of nonhuman animal behavior, it is necessary to have at least 
an approximate understanding of the theoretical role these terms are ex- 
pected to play and how they might systematically be applied. Ethology 
is the study of animal behavior within the context of evolutionary theory. 
In particular, an animal's behavior is examined in light of  its function 
and its evolution (see Hinde 1982 for a full explanation of the nature of 
ethology). Questions about the function of a particular  behavior are com- 
monly answered by explaining how the behavior in question contributes 
to the fitness of the organism. Mentalistic terms provide a level  of  de- 
scription that is appropriate  to the functional level  of description that is 
the concern of  evolutionary hypotheses.  Mental states relate organisms 
to their environments through the notion of content. A mental state will 
be adaptive insofar as its content provides for appropriate  links between 
environment and behavior. Mentalistic terms thus provide a natural vo- 
cabulary for cognitive ethologists to frame their hypotheses. 
In the next section, we consider the concept of concept and its role in 
ethological  explanations of  nonhuman animal behavior.  Moreover,  we 
discuss whether the concept of concept can be used to describe some of 
the mental representations  that explain animal behavior. Our intent is not 
to provide an extensive philosophical treatment  of the concept of concept. 
In particular, we  cannot hope to consider all the constraints on concept 
ascription that have been discussed in the recent philosophical literature. 
Among such topics are the alleged holism of belief and concept attribution 
(Quine 1960), the role of the environment in fixing belief (Putnam 1975, 
and Burge 1979) and the role of discrimination under ideal conditions in 
concept individuation (see Rey  1983 for discussion of this last issue and 
the various theoretical roles played by the concept of  concept).  Rather, 
we are concerned with elucidating a minimal constraint on cognitive rep- 
resentations for them to count as concepts.  This analysis will  enable us 
to suggest how one might search for empirical data to support the attri- 
bution of concepts to nonhuman animals. 
2.  Concepts  of Concept.  The "concept of  'concept"' has the ring of a 
philosophical topic, rather like the "meaning of  'meaning"'.  This latter CONCEPT ATTRIBUTION IN NONHUMAN  ANIMALS  225 
topic has been extensively discussed by philosophers (e.g.,  Grice 1957, 
and Putnam 1975) and has led to specific methodological suggestions for 
cognitive ethologists. For instance, Dennett has made use of Grice's no- 
tion of levels of intentionality to suggest research strategies for cognitive 
ethologists (Dennett 1983). A recently published volume of papers arising 
from an interdisciplinary  conference has also explored the possibilities of 
a fruitful interaction between philosophers and biologists on the topic of 
the meaning of primate signals (Harre and Reynolds  1984).  In contrast, 
philosophical work on the concept of  concept has been of  little use to 
ethologists. 
Many researchers in cognitive science regard the notion of internal rep- 
resentation to be a unifying theme in the different disciplines that make 
up cognitive  science.  Cooper, a psychologist,  describes the task of  the 
cognitive sciences  as determining "the content, structure, and organiza- 
tion of knowledge" (1982,  145) which she equates with "the internal  rep- 
resentations of the external world" (ibid.).  The notion of an internal rep- 
resentation seems closely  related to the notion of abstract idea found in 
Locke and Hume. Abstract ideas were the means by which human beings 
were supposed to be  able to think about the individuals of  some class 
without having to think about a particular individual. Thus the abstract 
idea of a horse included just those properties common to horses. Berkeley 
was famous for his attack on Locke's theory of abstract ideas, claiming 
that it was not possible to think of  a horse without it having some par- 
ticular color, height, and so on.  One interpretation  of Berkeley's  objec- 
tion suggests that it is based on the mistaken idea that the only way in 
which horses might be represented internally is in the form of a picture. 
The description of  other possible  forms of representation will  go  some 
way towards meeting Berkeley's objection, as well as going towards pro- 
viding cognitive  ethologists  with a workable notion of  concept.  In ad- 
dition, unlike a picture, an adequate  representation  for an abstract  concept 
has a logical  structure, or syntax, that connects its components (Fodor 
1975). The search for representations  with suitable structures  is a primary 
goal for researchers in acquisition of concepts by computers (Schank et 
al.  1986). 
The notion of  concept is not identical with the notion of  an internal 
representation  since attributing  internal  representations  in cases where one 
would not want to attribute  a concept is possible.  To develop this point, 
we will examine the research by Herrnstein et al. (1976) on pigeons.  In 
their influential and widely cited paper, Herrnstein  et al. have been taken 
to show that pigeons have concepts corresponding to certain natural cat- 
egories  (see,  for example,  Griffin  1981,  and Dasser  1985).  The three 
experiments conducted by Herrnstein et al. consisted of showing pigeons 
respectively pictures of trees, water, and a person. Included in these pic- 
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experimenters. For instance, some pictures contained only parts of trees, 
or showed trees in the distance.  In each case,  the pictures falling  into 
these  categories were randomly mixed  with pictures that showed  non- 
examples of the categories, including pictures that were considered near 
misses.  Examples of near misses for trees include a picture of celery and 
a picture of a vine climbing a wall. The pigeons were capable of differ- 
entially pecking at a feeder key according to whether the pictures fell into 
the category or not. These results have been widely cited as demonstrating 
that pigeons have concepts. 
The title of the paper by Herrnstein et al. is simply "Natural  Concepts 
in Pigeons", but it is notable that the only other place in their paper where 
the word "concept" appears is in reference to human concept formation. 
"Concept" is  never once  defined,  and it is replaced throughout by the 
potentially less  innocuous,  and philosophically  less  interesting,  "cate- 
gory". The term "category" is less interesting since it is more easily in- 
terpreted to pertain to the human classificatory scheme rather than that 
of  the pigeons.  To say that the pigeons  sort pictures into categories of 
tree or person is thus a considerably less specific claim about the internal 
representations  involved than the claim that pigeons have concepts of those 
things.2 
Herrnstein and his colleagues correctly make the point that no simple 
classification of the pictures in terms of common visual elements can be 
specified that will uniquely characterize those pictures that contain trees. 
Rather,  they  believe  that  the  notion  of  "family  resemblance"  from 
Wittgenstein is more likely to describe what enables the classification of 
trees together. They suggest that pigeons have an innate disposition to 
infer a tree category from seeing instances of trees. 
What seems to follow  from these experiments is that pigeons are able 
to  recognize  specific  properties in particular examples,  and use  these 
properties to recognize a general class or category. We are supposing that 
an explanation of this ability will  attribute some kind of  internal repre- 
sentation to guide the classification. But is this enough to allow us to say 
that the pigeons  possess  the corresponding concepts?3 It is possible  to 
teach a human being to sort distributors from other parts of car engines 
2One might criticize the paper by Herrnstein et al.  as providing nothing more than an 
argument by suggestion for the claim that pigeons  have concepts.  Since,  however,  they 
never say that pigeons do have concepts, it might be argued that they were never claiming 
that they do. Instead, it could be claimed that they were investigating the ability of pigeons 
to recognize and discriminate objects that are distinguished in human conceptual schemes. 
Unfortunately, their research is  widely  cited  for having  shown concepts  in pigeons,  so 
even if that was not their intention, it has, nonetheless, been the consequence.  Subsequent 
publications by  Herrnstein reinforce the  view  that he  meant concepts  in pigeons  to  be 
equated with human concepts (e.g.,  Herrnstein 1984). 
3This question has also occurred to some psychologists.  See,  for example,  Lea (1984). CONCEPT ATTRIBUTION IN NONHUMAN  ANIMALS  227 
based on a family resemblance between shapes of distributors. But this 
ability would not be enough for us to want to say that the person has the 
concept of  a distributor. In a suitably constrained environment, such a 
person need not have a representation of any information other than the 
shape to accomplish the sorting.4 
It is  beyond the scope  of  this paper to provide a theory of  concept 
individuation. Our aim instead is to provide means of assessing the sim- 
ilarity between human mental processes and those of  animals. Humans 
may represent environmental features in different ways and the question 
arises whether animals do likewise. In order to explain the different forms 
of representation, it will be useful to introduce a distinction between dif- 
ferent ways of using the notion of recognition. The distinction to be made 
is between recognizing an X, and recognizing something as an X or rec- 
ognizing it to be an X.5 The first of these can be thought of  as an ex- 
tensional characterization  of a discriminatory ability. The organism said 
to have the ability has some way of sorting things into the classes spec- 
ified (X and not-X),  but this may be achieved by way of properties that 
are accidentally coextensive  (see  discussion  below).  The  second  says 
something about the organism's system of internal  representation.  To have 
a concept of X where the specification of X is not exhausted by a per- 
ceptual characterization, it is not enough just to have the ability to dis- 
criminate X's  from non-X's.  One must have a representation of X that 
abstracts away from the perceptual features that enable one to identify 
X's.  In the case of distributors, for example, once a person knows what 
distributors do,  they have  a representation that takes them away from 
mere shape recognition. We  are not trying here to give  an account of 
either necessary or sufficient conditions for the attribution  of the concept 
of a distributor  to someone. Rather, we are pointing out that some forms 
of  representation of  distributors allow  for more sophisticated behavior 
with respect to distributors. For instance, having knowledge of the func- 
tion of  distributors will  help subjects to categorize anything that plays 
that role even if its shape radically diverges from the pattern they orig- 
inally based their discriminations upon. It might also allow them to reject 
some distributor-shaped  non-distributors. 
We are not denying the possibility that pigeons have concepts.  How- 
ever, the experiments conducted by Herrnstein et al. do not warrant the 
4In case one thinks that the real reason for saying human subjects do not have the concept 
of distributor  is that they would incorrectly sort a distributor-shaped  non-distributor, con- 
sider that the pigeons were not tested on pictures of accurate models of trees either. Allen 
(1989)  argues elsewhere that the possibility  of classification errors of objects outside the 
normal range of experience does not impugn attributions of intentional states to humans 
or animals. 
'This distinction is often ignored in the practice of ordinary speech. We are not making 
any claim that ordinary speech is incorrect, or that its practice should be changed. 228  COLIN ALLEN AND  MARC D.  HAUSER 
conclusion that pigeons have abstract concepts such as those of tree or 
person. The limitations of  the Herrnstein approach have recently been 
discussed by D'Amato and van Sant (1988). They used slide presentations 
to cebus monkeys to determine whether monkeys have the concept of  a 
person. The monkeys were trained in a manner similar to the pigeons in 
Herrnstein's experiments. While  D'Amato and van Sant claim to have 
evidence for the representation  of the person concept in cebus monkeys, 
they express reservations. In particular, they admit that their experiments 
do not successfully distinguish  between stimulus  generalization  and concept- 
mediated behavior. They also state that "continued efforts along similar 
lines are not likely to prove fruitful" (1988,  54),  citing uncertainty about 
the concept of concept as one of the reasons. In the next section, we hope 
to defuse this kind of pessimism. 
In this paper, we  will  not concern ourselves  with the attribution of 
concepts such as those of red or square. Such concepts, while they may 
involve abstraction  from stimuli, are likely to be more perceptually direct 
than concepts like tree, person or distributor. We will deal with the struc- 
ture of  these higher level  concepts.  As  an example of  how  theoretical 
considerations about concepts apply to empirical research, we  turn our 
attention to behavior towards the concept of death. The next section dis- 
cusses why death is a suitable topic and provides empirical observations 
that have been made of animal responses to death. 
3.  Behaviors  in Response  to Death.  Animal response to death is a sub- 
ject which has been of considerable interest to researchers in animal cog- 
nition (Griffin 1981).  For some species,  death of a group member rep- 
resents a substantial loss.  In the case of death of a mature animal, this 
constitutes a loss of group resources (e.g.,  defense against predators or 
competitors). When an infant dies,  any further "caring" behavior shown 
by the parents represents a potential waste of that organism's resources. 
In many species,  the presence of  dead organisms poses  a hazard thus 
making behavior which removes the dead individual adaptive. The ubiq- 
uity of  death in  animal experience,  and the clear advantage for  some 
individuals of some species of being able to recognize death and modify 
behavior accordingly, makes it of considerable interest to ethologists.  In 
addition to the theoretical interest in death is a considerable body of em- 
pirical work describing the response of individuals to dead animals across 
a variety of taxa. This body of data makes death a suitable topic for cross- 
species comparisons. 
While scientific literature  presents a fair amount of discussion of animal 
reactions to death, much of  what is written is  anecdotal in nature. Al- 
though we must be careful about the conclusions we draw from published 
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of  different species  to recognize  and react to  death. In no  species  are 
reactions to death catalogued as thoroughly as they are in humans. How- 
ever, in the examples discussed below, analogues to several of the human 
responses to death can be seen. We will describe some of the responses 
to death that have been reported in the animal literature  before attempting 
to interpret  the responses. 
Some of the most thoroughly understood behavior in reaction to dead 
conspecifics  occurs in ants, particularly  Pogonomyrmex barbatus. Their 
behavior is described by E.  0.  Wilson (1971)  as follows: 
The transport  of dead nestmates from the nest is nevertheless one of 
the most conspicuous and stereotyped patterns of behavior exhibited 
by ants.  .  When a corpse of a Pogonomyrmex barbatus worker is 
allowed to decompose in the open air for a day or more and is then 
placed in the nest or outside near the nest entrance, the first sister 
worker to encounter it ordinarily investigates it briefly by repeated 
antennal contact, then picks it up and carries it directly away towards 
the refuse piles.  .  .  . It was soon established that bits of paper treated 
with acetone extracts of Pogonomyrmex corpses were treated  just like 
intact corpses  . . . the worker ants appear to recognize corpses on 
the basis of  a limited array of chemical breakdown products. They 
are, moreover, very narrow-minded on the subject. Almost any ob- 
ject possessing  an otherwise inoffensive  odor is treated as a corpse 
when daubed with oleic  acid.  This classification  extends to living 
nestmates. (Pp. 278-279) 
Cowgill  (1972)  has described the reaction of  potto monkeys kept in 
captivity to the death of a cagemate. Two mated pairs of pottos had been 
kept in a single cage.  The death of the dominant male's  mate was fol- 
lowed  by  a period where his rate of  feeding  and overall activity level 
decreased. After a few days, the dominant male also died. Following this 
second death, the remaining pair were watched for a few  months. The 
remaining pair spent a considerable part of their time apparently "search- 
ing" for their cagemate. Additionally, the two remaining animals would 
leave a portion of their food untouched, even when the food supply was 
reduced. 
Among primates in the wild,  a number of researchers have recorded 
observations of mothers carrying their dead infants for considerable pe- 
riods of  time.  Jeanne Altmann's  (1980)  description of  yellow  baboon 
mothers in Kenya provides a perfect description of the general phenom- 
enon: 
Mothers persist in the apparently  automatic embracing of their infants 
even after infant death. They continue to carry the decomposing and 230  COLIN ALLEN AND  MARC D.  HAUSER 
increasingly  dehydrated  corpse, despite the fact that this usually means 
that they walk three-legged, setting the corpse down whenever they 
stop to feed and then retrieving it again.  .  .  . After about three days 
. .  mothers leave the corpse on the ground for gradually increasing 
periods of  time while  they forage at greater distances away,  even- 
tually either lose  it or leave it,  looking back at the corpse with re- 
peated signs of conflict and ambivalence and sometimes giving alarm 
barks. (Pp.  129-130) 
Among human cultures, reactions to death vary considerably. Differing 
cultural, religious and scientific beliefs affect the treatment  of dead bodies 
and the concept of  death held by individuals in the different cultures. 
Although these differences exist,  there is much that is common. For in- 
stance, all human cultures have some method for disposal or treatment 
of dead bodies.  While the methods vary, they all have the effect of iso- 
lating living individuals from contact with a decomposing corpse. Other 
human reactions to death include various types of  formal and informal 
mourning. Again, while these are different between cultures, it seems that 
there is a universal need for some sort of mourning behavior in response 
to death of close associates. The strength of the mourning response may 
be great enough to  interfere with other behaviors related to death. For 
instance, some parents may be unable or unwilling to make the arrange- 
ments for the burial of a dead child. Examples such as this raise questions 
about the relationship between concepts and beliefs.  However,  since we 
are interested only in establishing that a certain level of mental represen- 
tation is involved, we can avoid questions about the precise specification 
of the content of the representations. 
4.  Interpretation of Animal Response to Death.  In ethology, what counts 
as a useful interspecific comparison between two behaviors is determined 
by the role those behaviors play in the survival and evolution of the re- 
spective species. In the behaviors described in the previous section, there 
are a number of analogies to human responses to death. The ambivalent 
baboons are like the distraught parents who will  not accept the fact of 
their child's death. Even the ants' behavior is comparable to the human 
insistence on removing a corpse from the normal living and working areas. 
Some such parallels have been drawn in the popular science media, but 
there may be a useful scientific reason for such comparisons. 
From an ethological perspective, the ants' behavior may have the same 
explanation at one level  as human burial practices. That is,  removal of 
dead conspecifics  from the living quarters is adaptive (e.g.,  for reasons 
of disease control). The general statement of the hypothesis might be that 
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removal of the dead confers a selective  advantage. However, the mech- 
anisms underlying this recognition ability will vary between different spe- 
cies.  The stereotypicality of the ants' behavior is not enough to make us 
say that the ants do not recognize  dead nestmates. However,  it seems 
unreasonable to say that the ants recognize that their nestmates are dead. 
The ants are using chemical cues that within the normal limits of their 
environment serve to correctly pick out dead nestmates. Extensionally, 
within this environment, the class of dead ants and the class of objects 
with oleic  acid are the same.  Thus it is reasonable to say that they are 
able to recognize dead ants. But, their behavior is mediated by nothing 
more than the perceptual stimulus provided by oleic  acid. Therefore, it 
is not reasonable to assert that they recognize nestmates as dead, or that 
they have a concept of death. 
Humans, and indeed other animals, may not just respond to  stimuli 
features of their environment that happen to latch onto the right exten- 
sional class. In the case of ants, no indication of death is independent of 
the presence of oleic  acid. In humans, however,  a variety of perceptual 
inputs count as evidence for death. Even more important  than this variety 
is the fact that humans are able to modify what kinds of  evidence will 
prompt them towards the normal behaviors (e.g.,  disposal and mourning) 
directed towards dead bodies.  Thus, for instance, the advent of cardio- 
pulmonary  resuscitation means that lack of a pulse is no longer to be taken 
to mean that the victim is  dead,  although, of  course,  it still counts as 
evidence. Also, like ants, humans may be duped into believing that some- 
one is dead when they are not (e.g.,  by the effects of some drugs). But 
unlike ants, humans who have been duped in this way normally will mod- 
ify what they take in the future to be evidence of death so as to be careful 
not to  be  fooled  by  appearances. Humans are capable of  recognizing 
something as dead because they have an internal representation  of death 
that is distinct from the perceptual information that is used as evidence 
for death. It is this separate representation that is capable of explaining 
the human ability to reason about death rather than merely respond to 
death in the environment.6 
We would attribute an abstract concept to an organism if there is evi- 
dence supporting the presence of a mental representation  that is indepen- 
dent of solely perceptual information. In the following  sections, we dis- 
cuss two experiments that might provide such evidence. 
5.  Experiments.  We have thus far developed an analysis of the notion 
of a nonperceptual concept that involves  representation of some feature 
independently of its perceptual components. This analysis has not been 
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developed with full philosophical sophistication. It is, however, sufficient 
for us to suggest the kinds of experiments that enable one to determine 
to what extent the mental processing of nonhuman organisms reacting to 
death is  similar to human mental processing.7 In our view,  the experi- 
ments we present below do not enable us to make claims about the precise 
specification of the content of animal concepts.  Instead, what we try to 
do is make plausible the claim that animals can be shown to be operating 
with internal representations that function rather like human concepts. 
With this objective in mind, we  can suggest two testable features of 
behavior. First, an organism whose internal representations are concept- 
like should be able to generalize information obtained from a variety of 
perceptual inputs and use that information in a range of behavioral sit- 
uations. For example,  suppose animal A recognizes  animal B  as dead. 
Subsequently, A is presented with a stimulus that would ordinarily have 
evoked a response towards B were it alive.  If A is operating with a con- 
cept of death, it should be able to use the perceptual input that informed 
it of B's death to modify its response with respect to the subsequent stim- 
ulus.8 Observation of this kind of behavioral modification would make 
talk of concepts plausible. Our first experiment investigates the possibility 
of attaining  the appropriate  behavioral evidence. Secondly, organisms that 
can be said to possess  a concept should be able to alter what they take 
as evidence for an instance of that concept. For example, when first pre- 
sented with evidence that something is dead but then presented with con- 
flicting evidence that it is alive,  an animal should alter its responses to 
the first kind of evidence.  Our second experiment is designed to address 
this feature. 
Ethologists have traditionally preferred experiments that are "natural" 
over laboratory situations. The reasons for this are varied, but most can 
be related to the ethologists' attempt to provide evolutionary explanations 
of behavior. It is argued that these explanations are most valid when ob- 
servations of  animals are gathered in their natural habitats (i.e.,  those 
habitats in which natural  selection has shaped their behavior, physiology, 
morphology, and so on). Thus, the experiments we describe are designed 
for a natural setting,  although it would be possible  to perform similar 
experiments in captivity. 
The subjects for the first of our hypothetical experiments are East Af- 
7These experiments, though focusing on the concept of death, should be useful for think- 
ing about concepts in general. 
8Here, the relation between  concepts  and beliefs  might appear to raise its ugly  head. 
Behavioral evidence notoriously appears to be unable to provide grounds for distinguishing 
between on the one hand believing X falls under concept C, and behavior B is appropriate 
to C's,  and on the other hand believing X is D,  but B is appropriate  to D's.  But while this 
might present a problem for determining whether the subject has concept C or D,  it need 
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rican vervet monkeys.  Vervets are appropriate subjects for such an ex- 
periment because a great deal of work has been done to address the pos- 
sibility that their behavior is guided by complex mental abilities (Cheney 
and Seyfarth 1985,  Hauser 1988).  The experiment involves  an analysis 
of how female vervet monkeys respond to the death of their own infants. 
It is well  established that female vervets are capable of recognizing the 
individual distress calls of their infants and that other females in a group 
will look towards the mother of an infant that has just uttered such a call. 
These responses indicate knowledge  of  mother-infant pairings (Cheney 
and Seyfarth 1980).  Adult males also  appear to recognize the calls  of 
their potential offspring (Hauser 1986).  In cases where infants have re- 
cently died, these facts can be exploited by playing one of their previously 
recorded distress calls from a concealed speaker (see Cheney and Seyfarth 
1980 for description of concealed playback experimental method; in such 
experiments, the response of vervets to the recorded calls is no different 
from their response to naturally occurring calls). 
Vervet mothers might respond in three ways when presented with dis- 
tress calls from their dead offspring: 
(1)  They might respond as they do while  the infant is  alive  (i.e., 
look towards speaker). 
(2) They might respond in a more agitated fashion (e.g.,  initiation 
of searching behavior). 
(3) They might not respond at all,  continuing the activity in which 
they were engaged prior to the playback. 
For (1),  it seems correct to say that this would not provide any evidence 
of a concept associated with death unless gradations in response are too 
subtle to be distinguished by visual observation. (This, of course, is not 
the same as saying that it provides evidence that they do not have a con- 
cept.) However, (2) and (3) present more interesting possibilities. For (2), 
two possible  explanations suggest themselves.  Either the mothers have 
taken the distress call as evidence  that the infant is nearby, or the call 
has elicited some kind of "surprise"  reaction. Whether or not the mother 
had seen the infant die  is  relevant here.  If the mother saw her infant 
carried away by a predator, or saw it die due to disease,  then the first 
explanation would seem likely  only if the infant was not recognized as 
dead.9 The second explanation would be more likely for animals that had 
recognized the infants as dead. Control experiments that could distinguish 
9Again, one might worry about being unable to rule out other interpretations. Perhaps 
the mother does recognize  the infant as dead, but has other beliefs  that interact so as to 
produce the observed behavior. In humans, certain beliefs in the existence of spirits might 
account for such behavior. But such an interpretation would require supporting evidence 
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between the two explanations would help in the determination  of whether 
the animals are operating with a concept. Reactions to distress calls by 
females other than the mother could help provide such a control. Vervets 
are vulnerable to predation by leopards (Struhsaker 1967,  and Seyfarth 
et al.  1980),  so it would be reasonable for a mother who saw her infant 
carried away in the jaws  of  a leopard to infer that it was dead even if 
this could not be precisely determined. One could compare the response 
of a mother who saw the infant carried away by a leopard to the response 
of a second female who did not. The only evidence available to the sec- 
ond female is  that the infant is  no longer present with the group. The 
cause of this is unknown to her. In such a situation one might expect the 
mother to be startled upon hearing the infant's call.  On the other hand, 
one would not necessarily expect the second female to  show the same 
response. 
It is important to realize that, so far, the experimental outcomes de- 
scribed would not enable the experimenters to distinguish between ani- 
mals that have a concept related to our concept of death versus some other 
concept such as that of being missing.  Possibility (3),  however, is more 
decisive  in this regard. The  ability to  "turn off"  a response seems  to 
indicate that the animal has recognized the finality of the disappearance 
of the infant.10  If the infant were just believed  to be missing,  then the 
most adaptive response would be to begin  searching when the distress 
call was heard. For vervet monkeys, since young infants are rarely sep- 
arated from other group members for more than one  to  two  hours,  it 
seems  unlikely that a failure to respond after a period of  several days 
indicates a belief that the infant is missing.  This "turning off" response 
could provide the basis for an adaptive explanation of conceptual repre- 
sentation of  death. The ability to use  an independent representation of 
death (a concept of death) to guide behavior would be advantageous if it 
allowed rapid modification of  behavior in a wide  variety of  situations. 
For instance,  if  energy  would  be  wasted  by  fruitless searching,  then 
recognition of death will be advantageous if it deters such searching be- 
havior. In the case of the ants described above, the direct link between 
perceptual input and behavior, without the intermediate step of concep- 
tualization, leads to the "inappropriate"  removal of live ants treated with 
oleic  acid.  In the ants' normal environment, dissociation of  oleic  acid 
from death is not needed. It might be wondered where the adaptive ben- 
efit from having a concept lies.  Any mechanism that turned off the ver- 
vets' response would do.  The answer to this question is not simple, but 
"0We  are assuming that the response to the distress call has been modified too quickly 
to make a behavioristic explanation, in terms of deconditioning, plausible. We have some 
indication (Hauser, unpublished data) that such quick changes in responsiveness do indeed 
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we would argue that adaptiveness of the general ability to form concepts 
arises from a history of variability in the vervets' environment that is not 
matched in the ants' (Allen  1989). 
While thinking of a number of important controls that one would like 
to conduct for this experiment is  possible,  the majority turn out to be 
unacceptable, primarily for ethical reasons. One obvious control would 
involve removing infants from the group by direct intervention and then 
observing the mother's response to distress calls over a variety of con- 
ditions and period of time. However, the practical and ethical difficulties 
associated with such a procedure are often enormous, particularly with 
wild primate populations.11  Some of these difficulties might be alleviated 
in captive populations. The responses of captive animals are, however, 
often  difficult  to  interpret and may be  unreliable as guides  to  the re- 
sponses of animals in their natural  environment. Captive animals are often 
removed from their living groups for short periods of time (e.g.,  for med- 
ical testing); thus, most captive populations are accustomed to frequent 
removal and return  of individuals  from the group. In contrast, free-ranging 
vervets are rarely out of visual or auditory contact for extended periods 
of time. This means that disappearance can either be interpreted  as death 
or as migration  into another  group. Although males leave their natal groups 
upon reaching reproductive  maturity  and transfer  into neighboring groups, 
infants never do so (Cheney and Seyfarth 1983). 
It is worth noting that the most interesting response (3) was,  in fact, 
a lack of response to the call on the part of the vervets. The interpretation 
of  a lack of  behavior is  tricky since  there are a number of  alternative 
explanations. For instance, the animal might not have heard the playback 
or it might have been so engrossed in what it was doing that it failed to 
notice the distress call. While it is possible to reasonably discount some 
of these possibilities, the experimenter  is always faced with the possibility 
of  some unconsidered factor interfering between the playing of the call 
and the production of  a response on the part of the targeted individual. 
In addition to the problem of interference, a lack of response presents a 
further problem of  interpretation. A  definite behavioral response (e.g., 
searching) leads reasonably directly to  an interpretation (e.g.,  that the 
infant is believed  to be nearby). The interpretation is  aided by the ap- 
parent purposiveness of the behavior. In contrast, no response could be 
interpreted  in a number of ways; for example: the mother hears the call 
but does not believe it is her infant's, the mother hears the call but infers 
that she must have heard another infant since her own is dead, she thinks 
she hears the call but infers that she must not have heard anything since 
"tSuch  removal experiments are more common in studies of small mammals (e.g.,  ro- 
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the infant is dead. Undoubtedly, some of these interpretations  are overly 
anthropomorphic.  However, the general point is that the scant behavioral 
evidence itself does not distinguish between them. 
Another disadvantage of the current experiment is its lack of general 
applicability to other animal species.  Since the experiment relies on the 
ability of  females to recognize the calls of their young,  duplicating the 
experiment on other species would not always be possible.'2 The second 
experiment we  consider is  constructed with this problem in mind,  and 
has the benefit of being applicable to a wide range of species,  including 
humans. 
The second experiment attempts to investigate whether animals have 
the ability to alter what they take as evidence for death. To do this, we 
take an individual of any species  and administer a drug that causes un- 
consciousness  and depression of  vital signs.  As  we  remarked above,  a 
human is unlikely to be fooled twice into thinking that someone admin- 
istered this drug was  in fact dead.  In the first trial of  our experiment, 
animals are placed in a situation where they are expected to react as if 
the drugged animal were dead. As the effects of the drug wear off,  the 
animal revives and we record the behavior of the other individuals. For 
the second trial, the experiment is repeated some time later with the orig- 
inal animal being drugged and the other animals watched to see whether 
they react in the same way. The final trial of our experiment involves the 
same drug procedure, but a different individual as the target for the drug. 
The question here is  whether a change or modification in response is 
generalized to any individual. 
As with the first experiment, there are a number of possible responses 
and alternative interpretations  of those responses.  If the animals fail to 
modify their behavior between trials, this would tend to indicate that they 
make no distinction between death and its perceptual signs. On this basis, 
describing the behavior as concept-mediated would be unreasonable. If 
the animals modify their response both when the original animal is drugged 
again, and when the drug is administered to a new individual, this would 
seem to provide the strongest evidence that the animals are operating with 
a concept. A suitable control for this would be to see whether the animals 
continued to produce their normal responses to death in cases where they 
had additional evidence  that the animal was  dead (e.g.,  they  saw the 
animal get killed).  A  third possibility  is that the animals modify  their 
response only in the case where the original animal was redrugged, but 
did not transfer  this to cases where other animals were drugged. Although 
this case is perhaps less  likely,  it would present some interesting diffi- 
culties for interpretation. One possible  interpretation  is that the animals 
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have a concept of  death, but that they believe  that the first animal is 
faking being dead. Alternatively, one might interpret  the results as show- 
ing that the animals do not have a concept of  death since they do not 
generalize its conditions to all conspecifics. 
This possibility raises a potential worry about concepts of death. Hu- 
mans are capable of applying their concept to a wide variety of species, 
both plant and animal. But what if we discover that some animals only 
react to death in a more limited range of species  (e.g.,  vervet monkeys 
recognize death in other monkeys and apes, but not in birds)? One might 
argue that this shows that individuals of this species do not have the con- 
cept of death. After all, it might be claimed, if a monkey cannot recognize 
that a tree is dead, then it does not know what dead means. Alternatively, 
one might argue that the animals do have the concept of death, but do 
not recognize that or do not care whether certain objects are capable of 
falling into its extension. 
One view of concepts that is popular among philosophers (Quine 1960) 
and computer scientists (Quillian 1968) is that concepts are part of a net- 
work and that individual concepts can only be understood in the context 
of the network in which they are embedded. If such a view  is correct, 
the animals' concepts  will  match the human concepts to the extent to 
which  they  are embedded in  similar conceptual  schemes.13  However, 
whether or not one thinks that a particular species  of  animal has some 
human concept of death, experiments such as those we have suggested, 
which would show whether animals have representations of information 
that are sufficiently dissociated from perceptual stimuli to count as con- 
cepts, may still lead one to claim that the species have some other, per- 
haps related, concepts. 
Our second experiment is  applicable to a broad range of  species  be- 
cause it does not rely on communicative  abilities or other organism-specific 
qualities. Nonetheless,  in common with the preceding  -experiment, it is 
not without its own practical and ethical difficulties.  This is made vivid 
by the suggestion of conducting the experiment on young human children, 
which would obviously be unacceptable. Nonetheless,  it provides a uni- 
form base for comparison across those species where such experiments 
are considered acceptable. 
6.  Summary.  In this paper, we have attempted to describe a particular 
class  of  internal representations that we  believe  can be investigated in 
animals and humans alike,  without danger of  overanthropomorphizing. 
In many respects, the problems facing the animal researcher are similar 
13Contrary to  Quine,  we  believe  that the discovery  of  these  conceptual schemes  is  a 
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to those facing psychologists studying prelinguistic children. It is possible 
to see how the experiments we have suggested could have analogues for 
investigation of human children. The problems are also relevant to phi- 
losophers interested in the interpretation  of terms like "Gavagai" by rad- 
ical translators (Quine 1960). 
The notion of  concept we  have suggested is of particular use to eth- 
ologists.  It fits well  into functional explanations of flexibility in animal 
behavior. Concepts are capable of  explaining complex  abilities to gen- 
eralize over variable stimuli, to rapidly produce appropriate  responses to 
the common features underlying those stimuli,  and to modify behavior 
when it is discovered that perceptual stimuli are unreliable guides to un- 
derlying features. Furthermore,  this notion of a concept can be tested by 
suitably ingenious experimental design.  We have attempted to describe 
two possible experiments. Our discussion of these experiments illustrates 
the difficulties  associated with conducting this kind of  research. How- 
ever, many of the difficulties are practical or ethical rather than theoret- 
ical. 
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